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THE LOYALTY OATH AND FREEDOM TO TEACH
It is quite fashionable in the teaching profession to hold
for an absolute freedom to teach what you believe to be the
truth. The theory of relativity in truth has paradoxically
spawned an absolute liberalism. The old common sense view
that one man's freedom must allow for the freedom of his
fellow citizens somehow has come to be questioned by this
new untouchable fetish in the faith of Stalin's fellow-travel-
lers.
On the face of it, academic freedom (as absolute) runs
head-on into the freedom of the University, and both seem to
collide with that of the legislature.
A case study of academic freedom and its limitations is to
be found in the campus conflict and legal battle that took
place in the District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
of the State of California over the right of the Regents of the
State University to require a "loyalty oath" of a sort as a
condition precedent to employment for faculty members.
The main question at issue was whether the teacher or re-
search worker has both a legal and moral right (in California)
to be free from interference by the university administration,
the Regents, in expounding his beliefs. Once chosen and
found worthy of confidence, the teacher might well be allowed
to pursue truth and teach truth as he saw it. Why should he
be singled out for suspicion and made to take an oath of
loyalty when men of other professions were not so held up to
the public as in need of the threat of dismissal in order to
prevent disloyalty?
When the professors at the University of California were
first confronted with the demand that they sign an oath dis-
claiming membership in a Communist party organization or
group sympathetic to the Communist cause, many of them
suffered intense anguish and humiliation.
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The story of the debates that raged between proponents of
signing and those who were for refusing to sign is told in
detail in the book, The Year of the Oath by George R. Stew-
art.'
In the second chapter of this book, the author defines aca-
demic freedom simply as "the freedom, within an educational
institution, to teach and to be taught the truth." 2
Consider, at this point, that the University administration
had doubtless become convinced of the untruth inherent in
the Communist dogma and were determined to manifest
their concern for the teaching of the truth. The method
chosen was to question the advisability of allowing teaching
which insinuated somehow the legitimacy of forcible over-
throw of American government under present world con-
ditions.
The Regents of the University, together with influential
California University Alumni, believed that they were justi-
fied in requiring a statement of "loyalty" from the members
of the faculty as a condition precedent to renewal of their con-
tracts. The first demand in 1949 took the form of an order to
sign a "loyalty oath." However, on April 21, 1950, the Regents
withdrew the requirement of the special oath and modified
the flat "Sign-or-get-out" edict, passing a resolution provid-
ing that after July 1, 1950, the beginning date of the new
academic year, conditions precedent to employment or re-
newal of employment at the University would be added to
the previous conditions attached to the contracts. Besides the
execution of the constitutional oath required of public offi-
cials of the State of California, the University research
worker and teacher was to subscribe to the following terms: 3
Having taken the constitutional oath of office required of
public officials of the State of California, I hereby formally
acknowledge my acceptance of the position and salary named,
and also state that I am not a member of the Communist Party
1 Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1950. Pp. 156.
2 STEWART, THE YEAR OF THE OATH 14 (1950).
3 Id. at 145.
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or any other organization which advocates the overthrow of the
Government by force or violence, and that I have no commit-
ments in conflict with my responsibilities with respect to im-
partial scholarship and free pursuit of truth. I understand that
the foregoing statement is a condition of my employment and a
consideration of payment of my salary.
However, the compromise embodied in the statement of
non-membership in a Communistic organization remained
unsatisfactory to many of the faculty. As Mr. Stewart put it,
"This Is the Way It Begins" ' in a totalitarian state. The first
oath required from teachers is innocuous, "so gentle that one
can scarcely notice anything at which to take exception. The
next oath is stronger." '
In Nazi Germany, on December 2, 1933, only ten months
after Hitler had seized power, the first oath was required of
civil servants, including professors. "Thus started, the re-
quirers of oaths closed in, and the second oath was demanded
eight months later.... [In this one,] they were now required
to substitute by declaring their allegiance to 'Adolf Hitler,
Fuehrer.'..." '
The bravest of the non-signing professors, still protesting
against this invasion of academic freedom as they interpreted
the condition attached to their contracts, took the matter to
the California courts and found protection in the state's con-
stitutional law. A District Court of Appeal for the State of
California decided in Tolman v. Underhill,7 that the require-
ment of a non-Communist oath as a condition of employment
was invalid in California because it violated a specific pro-
vision of the state constitution which prescribed the form of
oath to be given to those in "office or public trust," and
specifically provided that no other oath, declaration or test
should be required as a qualification for positions of such
trust.8
4 Id. at 90.
5 Ibid.
6' STEWART, op. cit. supra note 2, at 91.
7 229 P.(2d) 447 (Cal. App. 1951).
8 CAL. CoNST. Art. XX, § 3.
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Finally, the California Supreme Court, on October 17,
1952, declared the special loyalty oath imposed by the Board
of Regents unlawful as prohibited by the state constitution.'
The court declared that "... the loyalty of state employees is
not a matter as to which there may reasonably be different
standards and different tests but is, without doubt, a subject
requiring uniform treatment throughout the state." 10
Eighteen professors who had refused to sign the oath and
who had lost their teaching positions as a result, were ordered
reinstated provided that they signed the loyalty oath required
of all employees of the State of California under the Levering
Act.
(The significance of the constitutional protection and the
position of the professors as persons in "office or public
trust" was demonstrated a short time later by a decision of
the United States Supreme Court which held another "oath"
constitutional when it was to be applied to state employees
who did not occupy positions in "office or public trust.") "
The Federal Constitution does not grant teachers an un-
limited freedom to teach whatsoever they please, nor does it
grant them any unqualified right to hold positions in public
schools. The cry of "thought control" does not have weight
when the common sense of legislators and their constituents
sees through the claims of subversive elements which have
infiltrated into the public institutions. The United States
Supreme Court, for example, recently upheld the constitu-
tionality 2 of the New York Feinberg Law."3 This statute
referred to the ineligibility for employment of any person
advocating the overthrow of the government by force, vio-
lence or unlawful means. In declaring the Feinberg Law con-
stitutional, the Court made the distinction between the
9 Tolman v. Underhill, 249 P.(2d) 280 (Cal. 1952).
10 Id., 249 P.(2d) at 283.
"1 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
12 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
Is N.Y. EDucAxoN LAW § 3022.
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constitutional right to assemble, speak and believe, and the
"right" to work for the state. It asserted that one can work
for the state only if he complies with the reasonable terms
laid down by the proper authorities. The majority held that
this statute imposed a reasonable condition of state employ-
ment.
II
The professors were right. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia so decided. The California Constitution provided that
no oath other than that required of all holders of office or
public trust in the State of California may be demanded from
those who teach in the state's universities.
Yet, with all of that admitted, it seems that the teachers of
youth who refuse to declare themselves publicly as non-Com-
munists when they are called upon to state their attitude are
missing an opportunity to exercise their leadership.
It is as if the officer-of-the-day had queried the sentinel
guarding the ramparts: "Watchman, what of the night? Have
you any notice of the enemy's position?"
The teachers in our universities should be acquainted with
the position of the fifth column which is the enemy in our
midst. They should accept the challenge of parents and Re-
gents by answering a legitimate question in so important a
matter as the security of our country. They accept other
conditions of employment.
There is no presumption that one is a Communist in the
condition that requires denial of membership in the Com-
munist Party. The Communist who swears he is not a mem-
ber of the party alone has jeopardized his position and made
himself liable to prosecution as a perjurer.
The oath of loyalty has been labeled an insulting limitation
of academic freedom. But it is difficult to understand how it
has become so discredited. An oath to think as some commis-
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sar dictates would certainly be such a dishonor to those made
to take it. But we can distinguish between the oath of loyalty
to our constitutional law and another oath declaring fealty to
a person or party. There is a vast difference between the two
oaths. The intellectual leader is rightfully expected to under-
stand and explain his insight into the nature of one and the
other type of oath. He, above all, is unjustified in lumping
all oaths of loyalty as of equal honor or dishonor.
As to the oath that binds me to accept control over my
thoughts, I am adamant. I find it odious (as to the rest of the
teachers it is odious) to be told what I must think. Only
those who have lost confidence in education and democracy
above the intellectual level of the three R's will wish to
abandon intellectual freedom.
The professors in the university are rightfully jealous of
their status as guardians of the heritage of western culture
in its best traditions. They deserve to be applauded for the
esprit de corps which they show whenever irresponsible dema-
gogues threaten to stifle their freedom to discuss and investi-
gate any new theory whose truth has not been demonstrated
beyond 'reasonable doubt. But that Americans have found a
practicable working philosophy of life and that it has worked
in their constitutional processes is not an untested theory that
needs to be debated, while chaos is accepted as a preferable
state of existence for ourselves and our children.
Teachers believe in loyalty and they believe in academic
freedom to teach the truth. As "loyalty" to Communistic
ideology is a counterfeit imitation of loyalty, so academic
freedom that does not direct its energy to truth is a fraud.
Consider, then, the meaning of academic freedom as a
means to its legitimate end, the common good of the organ-
ized community. It is fairly well ordinated as a means for the
promotion of the general welfare in the Statement of Princi-
ples underlying Academic Freedom and Tenure as stated and
endorsed by the American Association of University Profes-
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sors and the Association of American Colleges in 1940. As
indicated in the Association's bulletin: 14
The purpose of this statement is to promote public under-
standing and support of academic freedom and tenure and
agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and
universities. Institutions of higher education are conducted
for the common good and not to further the interest of either
the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The com-
mon good depends upon the free search for truth and its free
exposition.
Now, one sentence in this statement can be lifted out of
the context and distorted so as to appear to stand as a credo
for subversives, viz. "The common good depends upon the
free search for truth and its free exposition." [Italics mine.]
The true freedom is a means for the attainment of end.
Freedom of speech is not an ultimate end in itself as if a man
might with impunity say or shout anything in any circum-
stances.
In one sense, the end depends upon the means instrument-
ally needed for the actualization of the end. In another sense,
the means must be shaped so as to accomplish the good in-
tended, which is the real good in itself. The auto is a means of
transportation and money is a medium of exchange for goods
of true value. It is easy to see that my reaching a destination
depends upon my having the auto. If my dinner is to satisfy
my appetite, the quality and quantity of the steak depends
upon the number of dollars in my wallet.
Thus, in one way, the achievement of the common good
depends upon freedom properly used as a means in the honest
search for truth, its end. As the end, the common good is
prior in moral and legal value to the academic freedom that
must be ordinated to it. It is not the other way round. The
14 37 BuLETm N OF THE AmERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERsrrY PROFESSORS 84
(1951). This statement was also endorsed by the American Library Association, the
Association of American Law Schools, the American Political Science Association,
the American Association of Colleges for Teachers' Education, the Department of
Higher Education, and the National Education Association.
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common good does not yield priority to academic freedom, as
if academic freedom were of superior value, constituting the
end of educational institutions.
This is the core of the problem. We, who are in the teaching
profession, should be ready to help society rid itself of the
enemies within preparing to strike at the heart of our national
life. Where the means of academic freedom is dislocated from
its end, idealized, glorified as sacrosanct above all social
goods, the overall common good of society is blacked out by
its publicists. Then the real ends of education are mocked.
Freedom to teach does not belong to the perjured Com-
munist as a natural right' Where we lack the evidence to dis-
cover the enemy in our ranks, we ought to welcome a device
that helps to clean house without burning that house and us
in it.
It turns out that exponents of academic freedom are often
inclined to interpret their intellectual expertness as an un-
touchable privilege. This is dangerous. For it is here that the
Marxist sympathizer comes by his best chance to do harm.
Grounding his "right" to free speech on guarantees contained
in the American Bill of Rights, he tunes his trumpet to the
voice of direction from those in quest of our destruction. By
an abuse of academic freedom liberty is done to death unless
the officials chosen by the people come ot its rescue. In law is,
therefore, to be found the limitations of academic freedom.
An illustration of the inaccurate interpretation of academic
freedom is to be noted in the report on "Academic Freedom
and Academic Responsibility" given out by the American
Civil Liberties Union committee in May, 1952." This free-
dom, according to their standards, implies "no limitations
other than those imposed by generally accepted standards of
art, scholarship and science." This sort of "freedom" is law-
less, as it leaves out of its frame of reference civic standards
15 Commented on in 87 AmERicA 413 (1952).
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contained in constitutional law as determined by the highest
courts of the land.
No civic minded teacher will teach the overthrow of legiti-
mate authorities by violence. He or she will criticise corrup-
tion. Our founding fathers were not anarchists or tyrants. Our
Constitution may be amended peaceably. In self-government
the people have found ways to safeguard liberty of speech.
The Communist conspiracy holds no promise of improving
these legal guarantees. We who teach should know the differ-
ence between liberty and license unlimited.
Pupils in public and private schools are instructed to salute
the flag of the United States. That flag does not symbolize
tyranny and the suppression of free speech. Quite the con-
trary. It is fitting that the children of the parents whom we
serve show respect for the republic by their salute of the flag.
"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of
America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." While we instruct
others unto loyalty to the national political society as against
its enemies, let us not ourselves become derelict.
One does not fail in teamwork or show any failure to sup-
port the rights and privileges of his profession as a teacher
when he pledges his faith in American constitutional law as
the bulwark of citizenship. The children and all students who
come to us for assistance in the search for truth must not have
their confidence misplaced. Our lives and talents are dedi-
cated to the search for truth.
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